Using project data from a random sample of Phase II research awards from the National Institutes of Health SBIR program, we estimate the relative probability that woman-owned firms are able to attract private investments to fund the transition of the technology developed under the sponsorship of the SBIR program to an innovation to enter the market. We find that womenowned firms are as much as 16% points less likely to attract private investment dollars compared to male-owned firms, factors excluding the size of the SBIR award held constant. Women-owned firms that received larger awards performed substantially better. Although the SBIR program has a legislated directive to increase the participation of woman-owned firms in the program, our findings suggest that it might not be sufficient to overcome market perceptions about the profitability of such investments actually bringing a developed technology to market.
In this paper, we focus on gender and alternative private investments in technology-based entrepreneurial firms. As such, we draw on two bodies of literature to motivate the empirical focus of our analysis. The first body of literature relates to the role of gender in entrepreneurship and the second relates to gender and access to alternative private investments.
There is a rich literature on the role of gender in entrepreneurship. For example, previous research has shown that women are less likely to start a new business or to be self-employed than men (Blanchflower and Meyer 1994; Reynolds 1997; Blanchflower and Oswald 1998; Uusitalo 2001; Link and Welsh 2001) . Extending this literature, Fairlie and Marion (2010) show that affirmative action programs have led to an increase in women-owned firms in public procurement markets. Van der Zwan et al. (2011, p. 14) note that, while women "are a valuable and untapped source of entrepreneurial diversity [who] can function as a role model for other females to engage in entrepreneurship," in some European countries females face barriers to starting new businesses.
There is also a rich literature on the role of gender on access to alternative private investments, especially to VC funds. Most of what is known about alternative private investments relates to the VC industry, its structure (e.g., National Venture Capital Association 2011) and its economic underpinnings (e.g., Gompers and Lerner 2004) . In addition to industry-specific information, some stylized generalizations have been offered about the availability of VC to women in particular. One conclusion from the Diana Project is Gatewood et al. (2009, p. 129) 
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Women's participation in the VC industry has not kept pace with industry growth, and women have exited the industry at a faster rate than men, thus creating a significant barrier for women entrepreneurs in that it is less likely that their networks will overlap with the financial supplier networks, despite any effort they may expend networking and seeking capital. Wright et al. (2006) and Colombo et al. (2011) have studied access to VC by technology-based firms, but these firms were not necessarily nascent entrepreneurial ventures. Nascent technologybased firms, at least those in the United States, have relatively less access to VC funding than to other investment funds.4 Surprisingly, however, especially in light of the current policy forum and in the aftermath of the excitement of the Diana project, there is a conspicuous absence of systematic empirical information about the allocation of alternative investment funds to women-owned technologybased entrepreneurial firms, arguably the fastest growing group of entrepreneurial firms in the United States. This paper advances this literature on an empirical level in several important ways. First, our empirical analysis focuses on technology-based entrepreneurial activity within small firms. Second, that activity is quantified at the project level, rather than at the more aggregated firm level, which dominates the literature. And third, we focus on access to alternative private investments, which do include VC but VC is rarely available among such firms.
We find that female entrepreneurs are substantially less likely to receive private investment funding, compared to similar male entrepreneurs. The difference is less pronounced when more information, prior government funding in particular, is available to potential investors. We also show that, conditional on receiving private investments, female firm owners are likely to obtain less funding.
In Sect. 2, we posit a model of private investment to technology-based entrepreneurial firms, and we hypothesize correlates with the probability that a particular technology will attract such funding. We also describe our database of technology projects. It contains information on projects funded by the National Institutes of Health through a Phase II Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) award. In Sect. 3, we present and discuss our empirical findings. The paper concludes in Sect. 4 with summary remarks.
2 Quantitative analysis 2.1 Supply of private investment funds Gompers and Lerner (2004) argue that there are four factors that limit an entrepreneur's access to VC, or that guide VC investments. These include, with reference to a technology-based entrepreneur: uncertainty, asymmetric information, the nature of the firm's assets, and market conditions.5 These factors also likely apply to any private investment in an entrepreneurial venture.
Briefly, uncertainty refers to the fact that there is an array of possible innovative outcomes from an entrepreneur's technology, and this imposes an element of uncertainty on the investor's calculus about the expected return on an investment. In other words, the less certain the investor about the specific innovation(s) that are likely to result from the entrepreneur's technology, the less attractive is the investment opportunity. Information asymmetry makes it difficult for private investors to determine who the more efficient entrepreneur is. Objective signals that facilitate the investor's ability to scrutinize independently the innovation potential of the entrepreneur's technology make the investment opportunity more attractive. In the event that the research output of the entrepreneur falls short of its innovation potential, a private investor will prefer to have invested in a firm with collateral tangible assets compared to only intellectual assets. And finally, market conditions, meaning the expected size and competitive condition in the market for the innovation, will influence the investor's investment decision.
Thus, we posit a simple probability model of the supply of private investment to a technologybased entrepreneurial firm as:
where Private Investment is a dichotomous variable, X is a vector of project and firm characteristics, I is the indicator function, and u 1 ~ N(0,1).
Small business innovation research program and database
Equation 1 is estimated using project data on Phase II awards funded by NIH's SBIR program. The SBIR program was created in 1982 under the U.S. Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982 with the following stated objectives: to stimulate technological innovation, to use small business to meet Federal research and development needs, to foster and encourage participation by minority and disadvantaged persons in technological innovation, and to increase private sector commercialization of innovations derived from Federal research and development (R&D).6 The 1992 reauthorization of the program broadened the above objectives to emphasize the participation of woman-owned and -controlled firms.
Each government agency with an extramural research budget is required to set aside a portion (currently equal to 2.5%) of that budget to award to small (500 or fewer employees) U.S. firms (at least 51% owned by U.S. citizens or lawfully admitted permanent resident aliens) in response to requests for proposals on defined topics.
The structure of the SBIR program is defined by three phases: Phase I awards assist firms as they assess the feasibility of an idea's scientific and commercial potential in response to the funding agency's objectives; currently these are six-month awards for up to $100,000. Phase II awards assist firms to further their research with an expectation that the resulting technology will be commercialized; currently these are two−year awards for up to $750,000.
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There are no agency awards in Phase III; it is the period of time when the funded businesses are to move their technology from the laboratory into the market place. The firm is expected to find private-sector funding (e.g., from private investors) during this period.
Eleven agencies currently participate in the SBIR program, with the Department of Defense (DoD) accounting for nearly 58% of all awards, followed by Health and Human Services' NIH with about 19%, and DOE with about 6% (along with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the National Science Foundation with similar percentages). Currently, about $2 billion is allocated per year to Phase I and Phase II awards with nearly 98% accounted for by these five agencies.
As part of the SBIR program's reauthorization in 2000, the U.S. Congress charged the National Research Council (NRC) within the National Academies to make recommendations for improvements in the program. Among those evaluatory activities that the NRC undertook was an extensive and balanced survey in 2005 based on a population of 11,214 projects completed from Phase II awards during the 1992-2001 time period.
Projects funded by NIH are the focus of this study for two important reasons, the first being institutional in nature and the second being statistical pragmatism. First, firms that are funded through the larger DoD program and are successful in completing Phase II have a captive audience for much of their resulting technology, namely DoD (Link and Scott 2009; Nelson 1982) . In 2005, the year of the NRC survey, nearly 40% of the technology developed by businesses through DoD Phase II awards was sold to that agency. And second, among the five agencies, NIH-funded firms are the most active in attracting private research investments, thus affording our empirical analysis not only a large number of project observations but sufficient variability in those projects that have and have not attracted such investment funds. Table 1 sets out the data reduction process used to create the NIH sample of 323 Phase II awards studied here (i = 1 − 323 in the specification of Eq. 1).
Table 1
Data reduction for the NIH sample of Phase II projects
Data reduction Number of projects
Population of Phase II NIH projects 2,497
Data reduction

Number of projects
Survey population 1,680
Random survey population 1,677
Respondents to the survey 496
Random sample of respondents 495
Random sample of respondents with complete data 446
Respondents with complete data and still in business at interview date 323
Description of the variables
The dependent variable, Private Investment, in Eq. 1 is a dichotomous measure that equals 1 if the firm received private investment funds to further its Phase II research project, and 0 if it did not. The dependent variable equals 1 if at least one of the following sources of private investment was received: U.S. VC, foreign investments, private equity, or other sources from private firms.
The focal independent variable in Eq. 1 is the gender of the firm's owner. Female equals 1 if the firm is majority owned by a woman, and 0 if it is majority owned by a man. There are at least three reasons for emphasizing the gender of the firm's owner. As mentioned above, the 1992 reauthorization of the SBIR program broadened its focus to emphasize the participation of women-owned and -controlled firms: "to provide for enhanced outreach efforts to increase the participation of … small businesses that are 51% owned and controlled by women." One might speculate that this broadened per se focus could result in Phase I and then Phase II projects being funded with less commercial potential than otherwise would have been the case. If so, a signal to this effect, as related to this paper, could be the observation that female-owned firms have greater difficulty in attracting private investment funds in a competitive market than male-owned firms at the same stage of technology development.
A second reason for our emphasis on the female/male ownership difference stems from the literature on risk taking. As reviewed by Croson and Gneezy (2009) , and recently confirmed, for example, by von Gaudecker et al. (2011) , economic experiments show that women are more risk averse than men in both laboratory settings and in their investment decisions.8 To the extent that this is true, it might be the case that female-owned firms are less likely to make the necessary strategy and/or investment decisions that could be necessary for the entrepreneurial firm to take its technology to commercialization.9 As such, gender per se might send a precautionary signal to private investors.
And third, it has been suggested that there is a degree of discrimination against female entrepreneurs seeking financial investments (Marlow and Patton 2005) . Relatedly, network theory suggests that individuals associate with others who are similar to themselves (Aldrich 1989; Ruef et al. 2003) , and the VC industry, as one example, is male dominated and homogeneous.
We thus predict, in the context of Eq. 1, that female-owned firms will have a lower probability of attracting private investments than male-owned firms, ceteris paribus. However, a counter argument could be proffered following Gompers and Lerner (2004) . If women take on less risk, then the outcomes of their entrepreneurial venture are less uncertain and therefore, at the margin, more attractive to a private investor.
Also, held constant in Eq. 1 is the size of the Phase II award, Award. If receipt of a Phase II award sends a signal to the private investment market that the research has been screened at least twice (it cleared the Phase I and Phase II review hurdles) in terms of its commercial potential, then perhaps the larger the award, the greater the likelihood of commercial success, ceteris paribus, and the more likely that the firm will be able to attract private investment support.10 An interaction term, Award·Female, is also included to test for gender differences in the perceived potential success associated with having received a larger Phase II award.
Not all Phase II research projects were completed at the time of the NRC survey in 2005. Complete Phase II equals 1 if the project was completed, and 0 otherwise. As with Female and Award, this variable measures uncertainty; those projects that have been completed (i.e., are less uncertain) are more likely to attract private investment funds, ceteris paribus, because more is known about the portfolio of actual outcomes from the research.
Also mitigating a private investor's concern about leveraging a Phase II project's technology in Phase III is if the firm had previously been able to attract private investment funds for other projects related to the technology of the current project, Prior Private Invest. This variable equals 1 if such prior support came from a private investor, and 0 otherwise. Ceteris paribus, firms with prior success in attracting private investments in support of their research should have a greater likelihood of attracting additional funding.
Lastly, census-defined regional binary variables are included to control for regional differences in the availability of private investment funds, VC funds in particular (National Venture Capital Association 2011): Northeast, Midwest, and South.
The above variables are defined in Table 2 , and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3 . The smallest project in the sample was funded for $14,000. To account for any non-linearity in the impact of the award size on the propensity to receive private investment funds, lnAward was considered as an alternative regressor. There is no evidence of non-linearity, and the other results reported in Tables 4, 5 , and 6 are not substantially changed when this variable was considered. Also, when the $14,000 award datum was dropped from the sample, the results in those tables were not substantially changed. These results are available from the authors on request. Finally, as discussed in Link and Scott (2011) , it is not uncommon for a Phase II award to exceed the $750,000 threshold. Simply, the funding agency has the discretion to "add on" to the existing award when the technology being developed is especially promising to the mission of the agency A potential empirical concern in the estimation of Eq. 1 is selection bias resulting from the relatively low response rate. 11 This possibility was considered by estimating Eq. 1 as a probit model with selection simultaneously with a probability of response model of the form:
where u 2 ~ N(0,1) and corr(u 1 , u 2 ) = ρ. Age measures the number of years since the Phase II award was received. Absent is a theoretical argument for why some firms responded to the NRC survey for a particular project, we hypothesize that the older the Phase II award the less institutional knowledge that still exists about the project and thus the less likely the firm would be able to respond. Also held constant in Eq. 2 is the size of the Phase II award, Award. We hypothesize that the larger the award the more likely the firm will have responded to the survey perhaps as a quid pro quo for receiving a future Phase II award.
3 Empirical findings Table 4 presents the probit results for several specifications of Eq. 1 with controls for selection. The reported coefficients are average marginal effects from a maximum-likelihood probit model with sample selection. The standard errors are clustered by the NIH agency that funded each project.12 Table 4 Probit results from Eq. 1 with selection The parsimonious specification in column (1) controls only for the gender of the owner, if the Phase II project has been completed, and regional dummies. The results suggest that femaleowned firms are nearly 16% points less likely to obtain private investment funding (significant at the 0.05 level) compared to male-owned firms. The magnitude of this estimate is large; the descriptive statistics in Table 3 show that only 19% of firms in the sample obtained private investment funding after the Phase II award. This result confirms our initial prediction above, the Gompers/Lerner caveat aside. Also as expected, the coefficient on Complete Phase II is positive and significant (0.10 level). Firms that completed their projects are 11% points more likely to obtain private funding for Phase III, ceteris paribus.
Award and Award·Female are in the specification in column (2). Presumably, the way in which private investors use the information conveyed by the amount of the award is different depending on the gender of the firm's owner. The estimated marginal effect for Award is close to zero and not statistically significant, whereas the marginal effect of the interaction between Award and Female equals 0.3693, and is significant (0.10 level). The coefficient on Female is higher in absolute value compared to the specification in column (2); the marginal effect in this specification is −0.4401. We interpret these results to suggest that firms with a female owner are considerably less likely to be the target of private investors. Although a one standard deviation increase in the amount of a Phase II award (σ = $232,000) is predicted to shrink the gap by 9% points, the gap remains substantial. Stated differently, given two otherwise identical projects and firms, one with a male owner and the other one with a female owner, the latter's project would have to receive $1.2 million more in Phase II funding (assuming that the true coefficient of Award is 0) for the two projects to have an equal probability of receiving private investment funds to leverage the firm in Phase III. This amount is almost as large as the difference between the smallest and largest Phase II awards observed in the sample (see Table 3 ). Controlling for the amount of Phase II award does not produce much change in the coefficient on the Complete Phase II variable: its marginal effect is 0.1126 compared to 0.1085 in column (1).
The specification in column (3) controls for prior private investment support of research on a technology related to the Phase II award. The coefficient on Prior Private Invest is highly significant, and the estimated marginal effect suggests that firms that received prior private investment research funding for the technology related to their Phase II project are 30% more likely to receive private investment funding for their current Phase II project.13
In column (3), the estimated gap between male-and female-owned firms shrinks slightly: the marginal effect is −0.3397 compared to −0.4401 in column (2).14 Also, the results in column (3) suggest that firms located in the South census region are less likely to receive Phase III funding. The estimated marginal effects are between −0.1429 and −0.1500, depending on the specification, and are significant at the 5 or 10% level. Table 4 also shows the results from the first stage selection model. As hypothesized, the age of the Phase II award is negatively correlated with the probability of selection. The estimated coefficient on Award is positive in all three specifications, but not statistically significant in any.
The correlation between the error terms in Eqs. 1 and 2, rho, is negative, small in absolute value (between −0.18 and −0.21), and not significant. A test of the hypothesis that rho = 0 fails to reject the null with a probability value of over 0.6. Thus, we believe that selection bias is not an issue.
Absent is any statistical evidence of selection bias; the specifications of Eq. 1 considered in Table 4 were re-estimated with year-of-funding fixed effects. Table 5 shows the results from the probit model in which we do not control for selection. The coefficients are almost identical to those reported in Table 4 . The main difference is that the marginal effect of Female is slightly larger in absolute value, and so is the estimated marginal effect of Award·Female (−0.3745 and 0.3805 in the full model in column (3), respectively). These coefficients imply that private investors use even more of the information conveyed by the size of the Phase II award when deciding whether to fund a female-owned firm. None of the indicator variables for year of the award is significant individually, but they are significant as a group. Also, the estimated coefficients do not suggest that there is a time trend in the data.15 Table 5 Probit results from Eq. 1 without selection To test for the robustness of our conclusion that there are statistically significant differences in the supply of private investment between female-and male-owned technology-based entrepreneurial firms, as defined by our sample of Phase II research project firms, we considered the dollar amount of private funding that firms received to support their Phase II research, Amount Private Invest, as an alternative dependent variable. As shown in Table 3 , the amount of private investment funding varies substantially in the sample of 323 projects: the mean of Amount Private Invest is $0.9295 million, with a standard deviation of 6.8856.16 This variability suggests that by only looking at whether or not a firm received private investment funding we might ignore information available in the data.
Thus, we estimate a tobit model, in which
The variables included in vector X are the same firm and project characteristics used to estimate Eq. 1.
The tobit estimates in Table 6 are from the full model with all controls.17 The coefficients and standard errors in column (1) show the marginal effects on the latent variable y*. Column (2) displays the conditional expected values: the marginal effect of each independent variable on the observations with positive Amount Private Invest.18 Clearly, the factors affecting the amount of private investment capital that firms receive are similar to the correlates of the probability of receiving any funding. Female owners tend to receive less private investment funding, but the gap is narrower among firms with larger Phase II awards. Completing the Phase II project sends a positive signal to investors, and so does having received private investment funding in the past. Firms in the South Census region tend to receive less capital from private investors. Table 6 Tobit results from Eq. 3 Based on a random sample of NIH-funded Phase II research projects, our principal finding suggests that woman entrepreneurs are disadvantaged when it comes to attracting private investment funds to bridge the transition from invention to innovation. This conclusion does not challenge the legislated mandate to increase the participation of women-owned and -controlled firms in the SBIR program. Rather, it underscores that a legislated directive in itself might not be sufficient to overcome market perceptions about the profitability of requisite private investments to bring the developed technology to market.
We also find that private investors make use of available information to attempt to solve the asymmetric information problem. In particular, our results suggest that private investment funds are more likely to flow to a Phase II research project after it has been completed, and if the firm conducting the Phase II research had previously been successful in soliciting private investment funds on related projects.
This paper is the first systematic investigation of the flow of private investments to technologybased entrepreneurial firms, women-owned firms in particular, and the first systematic investigation at the project level. However, future investigations will hopefully be able to overcome some of the data limitations that accompanied the NRC database upon which our empirical investigation is based. In particular, our analysis in this paper is on the supply of private investment funds, but certainly an important next step would be to quantify how the amount of those funds and when they were received affect the firm's ability to leverage its technology toward the market, the success of the related innovations in the market, and the subsequent life of the entrepreneurial venture.
